Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement by Sheff, Jeremy N.
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications 
2012 
Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement 
Jeremy N. Sheff 
St. John's University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheff, Jeremy N., "Fear and Loathing in Trademark Enforcement" (2012). Faculty Publications. 36. 
https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications/36 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
Fear and Loathing in Trademark
Enforcement
Jeremy N. Sheff'
INTRODUCTION ......................................... 873
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENFORCEMENT .................. 874
II. TRADEMARK DOCTRINE: LEADING OR FOLLOWING? ... 877
III. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL ...................... 879
CONCLUSION...........................................883
INTRODUCTION
Much academic commentary these days concludes that
trademark enforcement has become overly aggressive.
Commentators argue that the increasingly expansive claims of
rights by well-funded trademark owners are unreasonable, and thus
that lawsuits asserting those rights amount to trademark bullying.I
But I think many, if not most, trademark practitioners would take
the contrary view that enforcement can only barely keep up with
the constantly evolving and worsening threats to their clients'
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. This Essay
developed from a talk given in the "Trademark Enforcement Considerations" panel of the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal's 2011 Symposium
entitled "IP Bullying or Proactive Enforcement?" Thanks to the organizers of the
symposium, the panel moderator Hugh Hansen, and my fellow panelists Irina Manta and
James Barabas.
I See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REV.
625 (2011) (defining trademark bullying and providing a framework for curtailing the
phenomenon through "shaming"); cf Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (analyzing some particularly dubious theories of
liability asserted by plaintiffs in trademark cases).
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brands, particularly internationally and online. 2  The purpose of
this Essay is to try and bridge these two positions by critiquing
each one from the perspective of the other.
The first step in this exercise is to challenge my own camp, the
academic camp, in this debate over the appropriate scope of
enforcement. If we academics think that trademark owners are
over-enforcing their marks, we should ask ourselves: why would
they do that? Why would any trademark owner seek to enforce its
marks unreasonably? Why would its trademark attorneys advise it
to do so? I will examine these questions in three stages. The first
stage is a bare psychological inquiry: what might motivate
somebody to do something unreasonable? This is where I will
introduce the dichotomy suggested by the title of this Essay (with
3
apologies to the late Hunter S. Thompson). The second stage is a
doctrinal inquiry: once we think we understand trademark owners'
psychological motivations, we can look at the law's role in
mediating them. In particular, we ought to ask whether trademark
doctrine is generating these motivations or responding to them in
some way. The third stage of the inquiry looks to the profession as
the nexus of doctrine and action and questions the role of
trademark attorneys in mediating these dynamics and advising
their clients.
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENFORCEMENT
To begin with psychology, let me explain what I mean by fear
and loathing. By "fear," I mean that a trademark owner might take
some enforcement action out of some concern that if they do not,
2 See generally Dalila Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in
China, But an Understanding of China's Culture Will: A Lesson the United States has to
Learn, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 325 (2011) (discussing persistent frustrations of
American trademark owners with lax enforcement by the Chinese government, and the
limits of legal and economic pressure in ameliorating the problem); Uli Widmaier, From
Metatags to Sponsored Ads: The Evolution of the Internet-Related Trademark
Infringement Doctrine, 4 LANDSLIDE 9 (2012) (discussing clients' frustration with
keyword advertising and domain names that use their trademarks, and the difficulties
their lawyers face in meeting these clients' demands to curtail such conduct).
Cf HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS: A SAVAGE JOURNEY
TO THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (Random House 1971).
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they will lose something of value that they currently enjoy. By
"fear," then, I refer generally to fear of loss. For example, the
mark owner may be concerned that the conduct of a target of
potential enforcement, if left unchecked, will result in a loss of
business for the trademark owner. The classic example and the
easiest case is the passing off of an inferior product, which
threatens not only to divert customers from the mark owner to the
target of enforcement4 but also, over time, to deplete the mark
owner's goodwill.5 We can understand enforcement actions
against a defendant engaged in passing off shoddy goods as being
motivated by this entirely justifiable fear.
Alternatively, mark owners might be concerned about losing
some legal interest or right that they currently enjoy if they fail to
take enforcement action. The classic example here is abandonment
through acts of omission.6  Failing to enforce a mark over an
extended period of time can ultimately, in an extreme case, lead to
a complete loss of trademark rights.7 Again, enforcement actions
taken to stave off the loss of one's trademark rights would seem to
be entirely justifiable.
If these examples suffice to illustrate "fear," the question
remains what I mean when I refer to "loathing." By "loathing," I
simply mean that a trademark owner might take some enforcement
action, not because it is worried that in failing to do so it will lose
something of value that it currently enjoys, but rather because it
simply does not like or approve of the conduct against which it is
pursuing enforcement. One could imagine innumerable reasons
for such disapproval. One highly controversial reason might be
4 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1860-63 (2007).
5 See id.; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON. 265, 269-70 (1987).
6 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) ("A mark shall be deemed to be
'abandoned' . . . [w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission
as well as commission, causes the mark . .. to lose its significance as a mark.").
See 1. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION §
17:8 (4th ed. 2012) ("Sometimes a mark becomes abandoned to generic usage as a result
of the trademark owner's failure to police the mark, so that widespread usage by
competitors leads to a generic usage among the relevant public, who see many sellers
using the same word or designator."); see also BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60
F.3d 1565, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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that the enforcement target is expressing a viewpoint about, or
creating some sort of connotation around, the mark owner's brand
that paints the mark owner in an unflattering light in the eyes of the
public,8 or is otherwise inconsistent with the mark owner's
marketing or branding strategy.9
We can see dilution by tarnishment as an example of this.
Pillsbury may not want its family-friendly Doughboy character
going into pornography, for obvious reasons. 10 But we can also
look at mark owners' efforts to discourage the use of their products
by persons or in expressive works that are somehow inconsistent
with the mark owners' brand strategies. Such efforts do not always
take the form of legal proceedings, or even saber rattling, but can
rather take the form of persuasion, suggestion or even pleading
with potential enforcement targets. Consider the recent spat
between Abercrombie & Fitch and the cast of The Jersey Shore, in
which the clothing retailer publicly offered to pay the boorish cast
members of the hit reality program not to wear its products."
There was no legal action taken, but there was, if not a threat, at
least an attempt to persuade the target not to engage in certain
conduct regarding the brand.12
Another form of loathing might arise where the enforcement
target is using the mark in a way that does not inflict any business
losses on the mark owner (as, for example, passing-off would), but
provides the potential target of enforcement with some benefit that
the mark owner thinks is undeserved or is perhaps better deserved
by the mark owner itself, even though the mark owner is not
currently enjoying that benefit. Here we can look to the emergence
8 See generally Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis.
L. REv. 158 (1982); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
9 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Brand Renegades, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT.
L. 128 (2011).
10 See generally Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
11 See Sheff, supra note 9, at 137-40.
12 See id. at 139.
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of a merchandising right,' 3 the expansion of infringement liability
to non-competing goods,14 and, of course, dilution by blurring.' 5
It has to be admitted that the dichotomy that I have set up in
this Part, between fear and loathing, is not a perfect one. There is
obviously going to be a mixture of motivations behind any
particular enforcement effort, and they might mix to greater or
lesser degrees. But for reasons I will explore below, these appear
to be the rhetorical poles that drive the debate over the proper
scope of enforcement measures.
II. TRADEMARK DOCTRINE: LEADING OR FOLLOWING?
What, then, is the role of doctrine in enforcement decisions? Is
trademark doctrine, including the examples cited above, leading or
following? Is it creating mark owners' enforcement motivations or
is it providing those motivations an outlet they would not
otherwise have? And in either case, is the motivation that doctrine
is either creating or serving primarily one of fear or one of
loathing?
It is easiest to identify the one area-and I think it is really the
only area-where doctrine is explicitly creating a motivation, and
that is the so-called duty to police. Professors Deven Desai and
Sandra Rierson have argued that the threat of losing trademark
rights incentivizes mark owners to undertake wasteful and
undesirable policing activities, activities that even the mark owners
do not want to undertake, but which they feel they must undertake
on pain of losing some right that they currently enjoy.' 6 It may be
' See generally Boston Prof'1 Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1975); Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wisc. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising
Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 478-84 (2005).
14 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV.
137, 181-84 (2010); see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907-23 (2007).
' See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 507, 519-22
(2008).
16 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791, 1834-42 (2007).
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that this fear is indeed responsible for driving at least some
enforcement actions that we academics would denounce as
bullying.
In most other areas, I think that doctrine has generally been
playing catch-up with the enforcement objectives of trademark
owners, moving where the owners want enforcement to go, for the
reasons that they want it to go there. The merchandising right is
one example. In cases like University Book Store v. Board of
Regents' 7 and Boston Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Manufacturing, s a monopoly was created literally out of
whole cloth and used to stamp out what had up to that point been a
competitive market in branded merchandise-for example, for
university and professional sports teams.
With respect to sponsorship and affiliation confusion, Professor
Jim Gibson at the University of Richmond has argued that doctrine
responds to enforcement activity in a feedback loop of expanding
trademark rights. 19 In his telling, incrementally more aggressive
enforcement actions by trademark owners produce a marketplace
in which consumers develop increasingly credulous views of what
might be a sponsorship or affiliation relationship, and those
increasingly credulous views feed back into the likelihood-of-
confusion standard, to make ever-more aggressive assertions of
trademark rights at least plausible.20  Again, the scope of
infringement liability appears to be expanding to serve the
motivations of trademark owners as expressed in their enforcement
actions, rather than the other way around.
A third example is the federal dilution statute,21 which, from
my point of view, is a solution in search of a problem.22 For years
17 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
18 510 F.2d 1004 (1975).
19 See Gibson, supra note 14, at 887.
20 See id. at 907-23; see also Sheff, supra note 9, at 145-48.
21 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
22 See generally Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law:
Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2008) (finding that courts treat dilution claims
as superfluous to infringement claims); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1029
(2006) (documenting the decline in judicial favor for dilution claims). Compare Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(b) (2006) (setting forth statutory factors for determining
878
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the statute was a top legislative priority of the organized trademark
bar. Congress eventually acquiesced, not only by passing a
federal trademark dilution statute, 24 but also by amending it to roll
back a challenge to that statute from the Supreme Court in Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue.25
So it seems that rather than generating fear among trademark
owners that leads to enforcement activity, the law seems to be
responding to trademark owners' demands by creating ever-greater
opportunities for enforcement. Moreover, in each of these
examples, I would argue that the motives of mark owners that the
law is scrambling to accommodate are not based in fear of loss, but
rather in the desire to expand trademark rights into new frontiers
where they had not yet been established-frontiers where they
might well generate economic value for the mark owner, but also
where others might otherwise (but for the expansion of those
rights) have been able to realize some sort of commercial or
expressive benefit without imposing any loss on the trademark
owner. So as a matter of doctrine, I would submit that trademark
law has been much more a vehicle for mark owners' loathing
rather than a source of their fear.
III. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
Perhaps, however, this is an unfair assessment. Let's take a
step back at this point to consider the point of view of the
trademark owner-or, more to the point, his counsel. A trademark
plaintiffs counsel might object that what I am categorizing as
whether dilution is likely), with Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495
(2d Cir. 1961) (setting forth remarkably similar common-law factors for determining
whether confusion is likely).
23 See generally Jerre B. Swann, Sr., INTA and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 159
(2003) (discussing the influence of the International Trademark Association on the
development, passage, and amendment of federal trademark dilution law).
24 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (1996).
25 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (interpreting the FTDA as requiring a showing of actual, as
opposed to likely, dilution); see also Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA),
Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006); 152 CONG. REC. S1921-01 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (describing the TDRA as a measure to clarify
Congress's intent in the wake of Moseley, and undo that case's central holding).
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loathing really is fear: fear of losing the value of sunk investments
in a marketing strategy; fear of losing prospective opportunities
and potential areas of future expansion; fear of a slippery slope, of
a death by a thousand cuts, of letting whatever strength a mark
currently has be whittled away, a process that begins with a single
unanswered stroke by a potential enforcement target. We
academics have two responses to this line of argument.
The first response is to disagree over baselines. That is,
academics argue that whatever mark owners are afraid of losing in
these areas-a brand image or a brand personality, a prospective
market of expansion in which the mark owner is not currently
operating-is not properly theirs to begin with. That is, what you
are characterizing as fear is really loathing in disguise. This is an
argument that has been made in one form or another by a number
26
of commentators, including Judge Kozinski, Professors Rochelle
Dreyfuss, 27 Wendy Gordon,28 Mark Lemley (joined alternately by
Stacey Dogan29 and Mark McKenna 30), and even myself.31  The
baseline argument has considerable power because as a matter of
intuition, I think, we are inherently more sympathetic to actions
taken out of a fear of losing something than we are to actions taken
based on loathing or jealousy of someone else's gain. Such an
intuition might be grounded in the cognitive psychology of gain
and loss-losses loom larger than gains, the behavioral economists
teach us.32 Moreover, this type of argument is not something that
should be new to most lawyers; in our first year of law school we
all learn that whether one considers a particular legal intervention
26 See generally Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960
(1993).
27 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 397-99 (1990).
28 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
29 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13.
30 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH.
L. REv. 137 (2010).
31 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REv. 767 (2012).
32 See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000) (collecting research on loss aversion, status quo bias, framing effects, and
other cognitive biases that can be influenced by the selection of a baseline).
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to be preventing a harm or conferring a benefit is often in the eyes
of the beholder and of the advocate.33
This baseline debate is an important one to have. It is a debate
on which we might not ultimately come to some sort of agreement,
but the arguments we will inevitably raise in defending our
positions implicate values that are fundamental to setting up our
markets and our society-values of competition, expression, and
fairness.34 They implicate not only the efficiency of our consumer
markets, but the distribution of the value generated by those
markets and the non-economic interests of participants in those
markets. 35 These are all complicated empirical and moral issues
that I think, as a discipline, we have not sufficiently grappled with.
The empirical aspect of such questions leads us to the second
response of academics to the practitioner's argument that what
motivates zealous enforcement is fear of loss. This argument
accepts that mark owners' motivations are not only-or perhaps
not at all-venal, but merely misinformed or misguided.36 This is
a position that has been taken by Professor Rebecca Tushnet with
respect to dilution,37 and by Professors McKenna and Lemley with
respect to sponsorship and affiliation confusion.38 As an empirical
matter, they argue, the slippery slope model is just not an accurate
description of how consumers respond to the types of third-party
uses of trademarks that are at issue in some of the more
controversial cases where trademarks are being enforced in a
particularly aggressive way.39 In fact, many such uses have no
effect on consumer perception of the mark or its owner at all.40
33 See generally, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (wherein Justices
Holmes and Brandeis dispute this distinction in a takings case).
34 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (establishing a framework for analyzing the moral arguments at work
in trademark doctrines).
35 See Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZo L. REv. 1245, 1249-51 (2011)
(discussing the complex empirical issues underlying judgments about the appropriate
scope of trademark rights).
36 See generally Tushnet, supra note 15.
3 See id.
38 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 1.
' See id. at 429.
40 See generally Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of
Harm, 95 IOWA L. REv. 63 (2009).
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This argument is admittedly somewhat in tension with Professor
Gibson's argument about enforcement feedback loops, 4 1 but it has
the benefit of being supported by empirical evidence in cognitive
and consumer psychology.42
This second argument raised by academics highlights the
central role played by the trademark lawyer in the dynamics of
enforcement-not only as advocate, but also as counselor. For
every unauthorized use of a mark that might become the target of
enforcement activity by that mark's owner, there is an important
question as to what the effect of the use on consumers, and thus on
the mark owner's business, is likely to be. One example that I
have drawn in other work is the liquor market.43 For over a
century, Courvoisier was known as the brandy of Napoleon, but
today it is the brandy of Busta Rhymes.4 It may be just shy of
exaggeration to say that the transformation saved Courvoisier. It
began, not with a planned shift of the marketing strategy within
Courvoisier, but rather with the unauthorized invocation of the
brand name in hip-hop lyrics, going back to the early 1990s. 45
Under the expansive notions of sponsorship and affiliation
confusion that we have today, and potentially also under dilution
doctrine, those types of invocations might well be the subject of at
least a colorable claim that might survive a motion to dismiss. But
bringing that claim would have been a huge disaster for
Courvoisier. Consider Jay-Z's reaction to Cristal when an
executive in the company that makes Cristal suggested-just
suggested in an interview-that maybe he was not crazy about the
association of Cristal with hip-hop nightlife.46 Jay-Z launched a
boycott.4 7 He started promoting a competing brand.4 8 He took to
41 See Gibson, supra note 14 at 907-23.
42 See McKenna, supra note 40, at 101-03.
43 See Sheff, supra note 9, at 134-36.
4 See id. at 135-36.
45 See id.
46 See Sheff, supra note 9, at 136-37 & n.40, 140 & n.59.
47 See id
48 See Louis Lanzano, Jay-Z Launches Bubbly Boycott of Cristal, USA TODAY (June
15, 2006, 6:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2006-06-15-jayz-cristalx.htm
("Jay-Z plans to replace Cristal ... with Krug and Dom Perignon at the Manhattan and
Atlantic City locations of his 40/40 Club.").
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the pages of Time magazine to drag Cristal through the mud.49
Thus, the public relations consequences of enforcement action, and
the business losses that can result from negative publicity, must be
a consideration in any decision whether to take such action.
CONCLUSION
In short, perhaps the most important piece of the enforcement
puzzle is not the law that we academics sometimes complain is
moving in the wrong direction, but the lawyers who bring
trademark claims, and in particular the judgment that they bring to
bear on the decision whether or not to assert a trademark claim. To
be fair, it is almost certainly malpractice not to advise your client
on the potential consequences of failing to take action against an
unauthorized user. But the duty to police is not absolute-not
every forbearance from enforcement will negatively affect a mark
owner's legal rights 5 0-and clients should know about that as well.
Moreover, clients deserve to be reminded that enforcement activity
comes at a cost, not only to society, not only to the targets of
enforcement, but to the client itself. Those costs are not just the
direct costs of the enforcement in terms of attorneys' fees and
expenses, but the indirect costs in terms of negative publicity and
loss of business. These indirect costs can be subtle but they are
vitally important, as our culture continues to generate increasing
demand for intangible and subjective sources of value.
I recognize that many trademark attorneys undoubtedly face
significant financial and professional incentives to maximize
enforcement activity. But I would suggest that those attorneys
might still do well to critically examine the motivations for a
49 See Jay-Z, Jay-Z on Cristal: 'Disrespect for the Culture of Hip-Hop,' TIME (Nov.
18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,2032217,00.html.
50 See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 17:17 ("While many defendants, and some
courts, talk about such a failure to sue in terms of 'abandonment,' other courts state with
vigor that the failure to sue others is totally irrelevant. The truth lies somewhere in
between."); see also STK LLC v. Backrack, Inc., Cancellation No. 92049332, 2012 WL
2024459 (T.T.A.B. 2012), slip op. at 43-52, available at
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdfflNm=92049332-05-21-2012&system=TTABIS
(holding that failure to police keyword advertising uses of a trademark did not render a
mark generic).
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particular enforcement action before advising a client whether or
not to undertake it. On the question of whether a particular
motivation is properly categorized as fear or as loathing, it may not
be the advocate's place to second-guess their client. We
academics and practitioners continue to fight that out, as we have
in the past. But on the question of whether a particular fear is well
founded, I believe it is the attorney's duty-as counselor rather
than advocate-to apply judgment and counsel moderation to her
client, to resist the traditional risk-aversion of our profession that
might be triggered by the potential consequences of forbearance,
and to consider, above all, the business interests of her client. This
is especially true in a world where the actions of a mark owner
towards its customers, its fans, its secondary market, its
competitors, and even its critics increasingly play a role in
constructing brand image and ultimately in generating demand.
